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As Hurricane Sandy struck the New Yorkregion on October 31, 2012, the healthsystem faced unprecedented challenges,
ranging from closed and evacuated hospitals to the
loss of power and depleted fuel supplies for millions of
residents. Although the storm caused more than
$71 billion in damages, with thousands of vulnerable
patients surging into hospitals and special needs
shelters, few lives were lost directly from the storm.
However, public health agencies, health care partners,
and community-based organizations were forced both
to respond to the event and adapt to the loss of health
care facilities with existing and ad hoc response
systems.1
In the biomedical literature, the concept of health
care “surge capacity” became prominent in 2002, after
the 9-11 terrorist attacks, and received increased
emphasis after Hurricane Katrina destroyed the New
Orleans health care system. The Agency for Health-
care Research and Quality defines surge capacity as “a
health care system’s ability to expand quickly beyond
normal services to meet an increased demand for
medical care in the event of bioterrorism or other
large-scale public health emergencies.”2 Yet, as noted
by Jenkins et al,3 a longstanding challenge in the field
is that mass casualty planning is not currently
designed to withstand the resulting patient surge
during such incidents, and that trauma “surges” lead
to excess deaths.
In large-scale disasters that include but are not limited
to detonation of an improvised nuclear device, a
major earthquake, or another large hurricane striking
a major US city, we will simultaneously lose health
care system capacity with damage to facilities while
needing to care for a surge of injured and ill people
seeking care. This cannot be accomplished by a single
or few facilities, but requires a region-wide plan.
PRIOR AND CURRENT NATIONAL ACTIVITIES
In the United States, several initiatives have been
aimed at improving our ability to respond to a large
surge event. There has been some, albeit limited,
intra-sector and inter-sector surge planning across
the civilian, military, and private partners. The most
consistent strategic impetus toward greater planning
has been through the Hospital Preparedness Program
(HPP) grant program (currently administered through
the Department of Health and Human Services’
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response).
This funding is provided through state and local
governments to support regional health care readiness.
Between 2002 and 2015, the HPP has awarded over
$5 billion to states, selected cities, and the US terri-
tories to form health care coalitions with hospitals and
other providers. A portion of the funds are distributed
to health care providers to improve their emergency
preparedness and to encourage collaboration and
mutual planning. The program’s budget has been
reduced by more than 50% over 13 years, with more
cuts requested in the proposed White House budget.4
Additionally, since HPP funds flow through states
and local jurisdictions, federal facilities such as US
Department of Veterans Affairs and Department of
Defense hospitals are often not included in the coa-
litions actually receiving funds.5,6
After the widespread impact of Hurricane Sandy on
health care facilities such as long-term care facilities,
dialysis centers, outpatient surgical centers, and oth-
ers, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) published their final rule for health care
emergency preparedness in 2016. This regulation
provides a national baseline of preparedness for most
health care providers. This rule requires relevant
facilities to have (1) an emergency plan, (2) policies
and procedures, (3) a communications plan, and (3) a
training and testing program.7 While this creates an
important floor for preparedness among all institutions
receiving reimbursement for services from CMS, it
merely codifies standards already put in place by the
HPP and the Joint Commission and other prepared-
ness standards that most hospitals already follow.8
The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)
was also established and serves as a federally coordi-
nated partnership of the Departments of Health
and Human Services, Homeland Security, Defense,
and Veterans Affairs. Its purpose is to “support State,
local, Tribal and Territorial authorities following
disasters and emergencies by supplementing health
and medical systems and response capabilities. NDMS
would also support the military and Veterans Health
Administration health care systems in caring for
combat casualties, should requirements exceed their
capacity.”9
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Additional funding through funding streams from the US
Department of Homeland Security such as the Urban Areas
Security Initiative and the state Homeland Security Grant
Program, as well as funding from the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for bioterrorism and
infectious disease preparedness provide some resources to
augment core planning efforts, but these funds have also been
reduced and are spread across many mission areas.5,6
The federal government also has the capacity to supplement
state and local health response in the event that aid is
requested and a federal Stafford Act disaster is declared.
These Emergency Support Function 8 assets are loosely
modeled on Department of Defense medical capabilities and
include Federal Medical Stations, Disaster Medical Assistance
Teams, Disaster Mortuary Assistance Teams, Veterinary
Medical Assistance Teams, National Medical Response
Teams, deployable US Public Health Service teams, the
Laboratory Response Network, the CDC Strategic National
Stockpile, and Federal Emergency Management Agency
reimbursement for acute care hospital care provided during a
disaster.
While these assets are available within days of an event, they
are not immediately available, remain limited in scope, and
are intended to provide temporary support to communities.
They are not designed to assist with region-wide evacuations
or transfers that would impact health care facilities in a large
regional event.
The Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), with 200,000 volunteers
throughout the country, is an important capability in many
localities. While their volunteers are impressively engaged in
community preparedness activities, the MRC would benefit
from additional funding to support higher level training and
increased regional coordination.
DISCUSSION
The American health care system is not ready for a large
disaster event with hundreds let alone thousands or even tens
of thousands of casualties. Such a catastrophic event, whether
a natural disaster or terrorist event, will undoubtedly cause
damage to some hospitals and other health care facilities,
while simultaneously increasing the number of injured
seeking care. The combined loss of capacity and increased
need could be devastating without proper planning. We must
create regional health care systems that allow for partial
“controlled failure” of some of the facilities but are still able to
surge to provide optimum care for the injured and sick.
Deploying assets from the rest of the nation cannot meet the
“golden hour” needs of the critically sick and injured.
Despite prior efforts, many constraints still limit the health
care system’s ability to provide care in catastrophic disaster
events. The greatest difficulty is that most essential
components of the American health care system operate
within the private sector, even though these functions
are vital elements of the critical infrastructure necessary for
disaster response. Other aspects of critical infrastructure are
either publicly owned or heavily regulated to require pre-
paredness and mitigation. Hospitals have been required to
have disaster planning for many years, and the aforemen-
tioned CMS Emergency Preparedness Rule now requires
17 other types of health care providers from nursing homes to
dialysis centers to plan and train for disasters. However,
hospitals and long-term care facilities survive on a thin profit.
The American Hospital Association reported that in 2014,
30% of all hospitals had a negative operating margin and that
the average operating margin was just 6.4%.10 The cost of
preparedness and stockpiling adds further stress to these thin
margins. Private facilities also compete with one another in
the same regional market, which would require coordinated
planning and response efforts. They have economic incentive
to compete, not to cooperate.
Budget cuts for health and public health preparedness also
have a great impact beyond the disaster-specific grants
described above. The American Hospital Association states
that if the Affordable Care Act is repealed, “Losses of this
magnitude cannot be sustained and will adversely impact
patients’ access to care, decimate hospitals’ and health
systems’ ability to provide services….”11 In addition to this
reduction, the current budget proposes even greater reduc-
tions in federal spending for health care preparedness.4
In conclusion, a more comprehensive approach to health care
preparedness is required. The piecemeal approach and short-
term budgeting will not create the kind of cross-sector, health
care response infrastructure that is required to meet 21st
century challenges. A true strategy for improving regional
health care surge response requires, among other things:
∙ Funding and leadership to establish a stronger evidence
base for health care surge events, including modeling to
predict impacts on and needs for post-disaster health
services.
∙ Operational research to identify best practices in commu-
nication, coordination, and service delivery.
∙ Increased and stabilized funding for the health care
preparedness programs with stronger emphasis on integra-
tion with Department of Defense and Veterans Affairs
(including but not limited to NDMS).
∙ Stronger incentives for private sector investment in
preparedness and regional coordination.
Continuing discussions among the disaster response commu-
nity following Superstorm Sandy emphasized the need for
more extensive and effective regional surge capacity planning
as an essential component of preparing for future natural and
human-caused mass casualty incidents likely to be more
severe and unpredictable.
Regions Respond to Catastrophes
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness400 VOL. 11/NO. 4
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dmp.2017.103
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Columbia University - Law Library, on 14 Aug 2017 at 13:32:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
About the Authors
National Center for Disaster Medicine and Public Health, Uniformed Services
University, Bethesda, Maryland (Dr Kirsch and Ms Strauss-Riggs); National Center
for Disaster Preparedness (NCDP) at Columbia University’s Earth Institute, New
York, New York (Mr Schlegelmilch); NCDP and Teachers College, Columbia
University, New York, New York (Dr Chandler); NCDP and Department of Health
Policy and Management, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, and
Children’s Health Fund, New York, New York (Dr Redlener).
REFERENCES
1. Chandler T, Abramson DM, Panigrahi B, et al. Crisis decision-
making during Hurricane Sandy: an analysis of established and emergent
disaster response behaviors in the New York metro area. Disaster Med Public
Health Prep. 2016;10(3):436-442. https://doi.org/10.1017/dmp.2016.68.
2. Agency for Health care Research and Quality. Bioterrorism and Health
System Preparedness: Issue Briefs. AHRQ website. https://archive.ahrq.
gov/news/ulp/btbriefs/. Published 2006. Accessed July 20, 2017.
3. Jenkins PC, Richardson CR, Norton EC, et al. Trauma surge index:
advancing the measurement of trauma surges and their influence on
mortality. J Am Coll Surg. 2015;221(3):729-738.e1. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.jamcollsurg.2015.05.016.
4. White House. Budget for the U.S. Government. A New Foundation for
America Greatness. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/
files/omb/budget/fy2018/budget.pdf. Accessed July 30, 2017.
5. Schlegelmilch J, Petkova E, Redlener I. Disaster prepared: how federal
funding in the USA supports health system and public health readiness.
J Bus Continuity Emerg Plann. 2015;9(2):112-118.
6. Watson C, Watson M, Kirk Sell T. Federal funding for health security in
FY2018 [published online June 27, 2017]. Health Secur. doi: 10.1089/hs.
2017.0047.
7. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Emergency Preparedness Rule.
CMS.gov website. https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-
and-Certification/SurveyCertEmergPrep/Emergency-Prep-Rule.html. Last
updated June 20, 2017. Accessed July 20, 2017.
8. YNHHS-CEPDR. CMS Emergency Preparedness Final Rule Crosswalk -
Updated. New Haven, CT: Yale New Haven Health System Center for
Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Response; 2017.
9. US Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response. National Disaster Medical System.
Public Health Emergency website. https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/
responders/ndms/Pages/default.aspx. Last updated April 21, 2017. Accessed
July 20, 2017.
10. American Hospital Association. Trendwatch Chartbook 2016 - Trends
Affecting Hospitals and Health Systems. AHA website. http://www.aha.
org/research/reports/tw/chartbook/index.shtml. Published 2016. Accessed
July 20, 2017.
11. Federation of American Hospitals and American Hospital Association.
Estimating the impact of repealing the Affordable Care Act on hospitals.
http://www.aha.org/content/16/impact-repeal-aca-report.pdf. Published
2016. Accessed July 17, 2016.
Cover Image:
Components of a disaster
Regions Respond to Catastrophes
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 401
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dmp.2017.103
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Columbia University - Law Library, on 14 Aug 2017 at 13:32:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
